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The visually guided control of helicopter flight is a human achievement, and thus,understanding
this skill is, in part, a psychological problem. The abilities of skilled pilots are impressive, and yet it
is of concern that pilots' performance is less than ideal:They suffer from workload constraints, make
occasional make errors, and are subject to such debilities as simulator sickness. Remedying such
deficiencies is both an engineering and a psychological problem.
When studying the psychological aspects of this problem, it is desirable to simplify the problem
as much as possible, and thereby sidestep as many intractable psychological issues as possible.
Simply stated, we do not want to have to resolve such polemics as the mind-body problem in order
to contribute to the design of more effective helicopter systems. On the other hand, the study of
human behavior is a psychological endeavor and certain problems cannot be evaded.
In this paper I discusses four related issues that are of psychological significance in understand-
ing the visually guided control of helicopter flight. First, I present a selected discussion of the nature
of descriptive levels in analyzing human perception and performance. Here I will argue that the
appropriate level of description for perception is kinematical, and for performance, it is procedural.
Second, I argue that investigations into pilot performance cannot ignore the nature of pilots' phe-
nomenal experience. The conscious control of actions is not based upon environmental states of
affairs, nor upon the optical information that specifies them. Actions are coupled to perceptions.
Third,I discuss the acquisition of skiUed actions in the context of inherent misperceptions. Such
skills may be error prone in some situations, but not in others. Finally, I discuss the contextual
relativity of human errors.
Each of these four issues relates to a common theme: The control of action is mediated by
phenomenal experience, the veracity of which is context specific.
LEVELS OF DESCRIPTION
How do we characterize what helicopter pilots are doing? One answer to this question is that
pilots are controlling the dynamics of their craft. At one level of description it makes sense to
describe pilots' behavior in these terms; however, at another it does not.
Within some control theory models, pilots are characterized as having perfect understandings of
the dynamical properties of their flight environment. Given the nature of the variables under exami-
nation in these models, it does not matter that the achievement of such dynamical understandings
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makes no psychological sense. However, from the point of view of understanding task performance
related to other pilot variables, more appropriate characterizations of human behavior are needed.
I argue that pilots can achieve only very simplistic understandings about dynamics, and that the
appropriate level of description for perception is kinematical,and for control, it is procedural.
Dynamics Versus Kinematics
In Classical Mechanics, dynamical analyses relate to the action of bodies that move due to the
application of forces. In nature, object motions are constrained by the law of least action, where
action has the dimensions of energy x time. Kinematical analyses, on the other hand, deal only with
pure object motions without consideration of mass, and thus, of energy. As a level of analyses,
kinematics is far less restrictive than is dynamics: Most of the object motions that can be describe in
kinematics are inconsistent with Newton's Laws.
Research has shown that people's understandings of dynamics is extremely simplistic and
heuristical (Proffitt & Gilden, 1989). Moreover, the spontaneous dynamical intuitions of trained
physicists differ very little from those of unsophisticated people. Physicists' expertise becomes evi-
dent only when they are permitted to symbolically represent the system under consideration. In this
sense physicists have a dual awareness: One is immediate, appeals to phenomenal categories, and
differs little from naive common sense; the other is deliberate, appeals to the symbolic categories of
first principle representations (e.g. F = ma), and is far removed from common sense. I propose that
helicopter pilots do not fly their crafts by controlling dynamics. Being people, pilots have neither the
perceptual nor conceptual ability to penetrate their helicopter's dynamics during flight. Rather the
problem of representing the control of helicopter flight is best stated in terms of a mapping between
phenomenal variables. That is, pilots must relate the kinematical variables available in perceptual
stimulation to appropriate control actions. The dynamics of the craft constrain the nature of this per-
ception/action coupling; however, the pilot need not appreciate these dynamics in order to exploit
them. In essence, pilots need to appreciate the dynamics of helicopters no better than children need
to understand the dynamics of their bicycles. The rules that define skilled control of a particular
mechanical system, need not embody any of the system's dynamics. These rules (transform func-
tions) relate one class of kinematical variables, perceptions, to another, actions.
Declarative Versus Procedural Knowledge
There is a very old distinction between "knowing how" versus "knowing that" that has more
recently come to be described as procedural versus declarative knowledge. Procedural knowledge
consists of rules for regulating skilled behaviors; they are recipes for action, are evoked by specific
situational variables, and are typically not accessible to awareness. Riding a bicycle or flying a heli-
copter depends upon procedural forms of knowledge. Declarative knowledge is explicit and entails a
conscious conceptualization and articulation about some state of affairs.
Piloting a helicopter evokes procedural knowledge. These rules are not general because they are
blind to the underlying dynamics of the vehicle. The dynamics of helicopter flight create an envi-
ronment in which particular kinematical variables in perception and action are related in specific
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ways.Learningtheserelationshipsestablishesproceduresfor producingdesiredkinematical
outcomes.
PHENOMENA
Pilots fly helicopters by heeding and affecting phenomenal states of affairs. What are the relevant
phenomena? During the NASA Workshop, my group picked slant perception as a phenomena to
study.
This choice was motivated by the existence of a striking everyday phenomena that may jeopar-
dize successful low altitude flying. When, for example, people drive in San Francisco, they cannot
help but be struck by the incredibly steep inclines of some of the roads that they encounter. When
asked to estimate the slopes of these hills,people provide erroneous estimates in the neighborhood of
45-75 deg (informally collected anecdotal evidence). In fact, the steepest road is no more than 15
deg. Evidence exists that this is a general finding (Ross, 1974). When approaching a large incline,
such as a hill, people grossly overestimate its slant.
We decided to study the psychophysics of this phenomena by initially asking the question: What
slant will be perceived for (1) various hill slants, (2) viewed at various altitudes, (3) by a moving
observer who either approaches or moves laterally with respect to the hill (4) at different speeds.
These, of course, are frequently encountered situations for helicopter pilots.
Our prediction was that slant will be greatly overestimated in all conditions and that this error
will be greatest when the hill is approached head-on at low altitudes. Other more specific hypotheses
were formulated for each of the other variables.
In addition to mapping out the psychophysics of slant perception across these variable, we hope
to determine the visual variables that affect slant perception, and ultimately to develop a model for
human slant perception. With regard to this latter goal, levels of description issues again emerge. In
particular, we would like to know the geometrical space in which kinematic information is repre-
sented (see Lappin this volume).
From a geometrical perspective, the slant of a hill is fully specified to a moving observer; how-
ever, people seem not to appreciate well the optical information that is available. This implies that
people have either (1) little sensitivity to the available information, or (2) that they possess the
required sensitivities, but are unable to use it effectively when making slant judgments.
CONTROL
Given that people misperceive the slant of hills, why do they not evidence this misperception
when walking up them? The answer to this question, and the related helicopter control issue, is that
accurate perceptions of environmental state of affairs are not required for effective control of action
153
within thesituation.Solong asperceptualattributesco-varyperfectlywith environmentaldimen-
sions,controlwill not reflectonunderlyingmisperceptions.
Considerhow control behaviorsarelearnedin asituationlike flying ahelicopterat low altitudes
overahill. Supposethatthenovicepilot misperceivestheslantof ahill to be60degwhen,in fact,
its inclination is 15deg.In orderto maintainthedesiredaltituderelativeto thehill, thepilot must
learnto coupletheappropriatecontrolresponsesto whatis perceived.To put themattersimply,he
or shemustlearnto pull backon thestickby someamount,giventhat ahill of someperceivedslant
isapproaching.Throughlearning,thepilot will cometo coupletheappropriatecontrol responsesto
themisperceptionof slant.It doesnotmatterthatslantismisperceived,sincecontrol responseshave
beenacquiredin thecontextof thismisperception,andthemisperceptionco-varieswith distalslant.
That fundamentalmisperceptionsmaynotbeevidencedin particularcontrolcontexts,doesnot
imply that theywill neverresultin pilot error.Oneworkinghypothesisfor theoverestimationof
slantis aconjecturethattheperceivedhorizonis displacedbelowits actuallocation.This concomi-
tantto slantmisperceptionmighthaveno influenceon flying overahill, butmight verywell effect
judgmentsof theheightfor obstaclesencounteron thehill. Giventhattheperceivedlocationof the
horizonmayserveasanimportantcueto whetheranobstacleis aboveor belowonesflight path,
misperceivingslantmayresultin errorsin somecontextsbut not in others.
ERRORS
Thesortsof controlerrorsthatpeoplemaketendto becontextspecific.Accidentsthatoccurin
helicopterflight are known to be far more likely in certain situations than in others. Assuming a
skilled operator, the contextual specificity of control errors derives not from a single cause but rather
from at least three quite different sources.
Workload
Obviously, some situations require considerably more effort than do others. Some of these con-
texts present a greater diversity of task relevant information requiring attentional allocation and
information integration. In other situations, the control behaviors are particularly arduous. And
finally, some situations present especially difficult demands on both perceptual and control
resources.
Degraded or Missing Information
As tasks move farther from those encountered in everyday experience, it becomes increasing
likely that the information that is typically relied upon to perceive some environmental state of
affairs may be reduced or absent. For example, optical flow rate specifies speed only if the observer
knows his or her altitude. Thus, optical flow suffices in perceiving speed for a locomoting person
accustomed to his or her own eye height, but not when that person is piloting an aircraft.
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Misperceptions
As the above discussion on slant misperception noted, misperceptions may be inconsequential in
some contexts, but not in others. Moreover, context can be defined in two quite different ways. First,
context may be def'med in terms of the environment: maintaining a constant altitude while flying
over a hill versus deciding whether a tree is above or below one's flight path. Here the contexts have
an externai referent: hills and trees. On the other hand, contexts can be defined by differential task
demands that arise in the same physical situation. Thus, for example, a pilot may successfully main-
tain a constant altitude while piloting his or her craft over a hill, thereby implying that the hill's slope
was accurately perceived. However, if asked to estimate the slope of the hill verbally, or by adjusting
a visual or manual slant indicator, that same individual will evidence a strong overestimation of
slant.
It is tempting to ignore or disparage the significance of the explicit slant estimation error, since
only the control of altitude has practical significance. I think that this would be a mistake, ff we want
to understand what a pilot is doing, we must take a psychological perspective, and thereby recognize
that the visually guided control of action is mediated by phenomenal experience. Thus, an adequate
account of visually guided control cannot simply attempt a mapping of environmental properties, as
they are manifest in optical structure, onto control behaviors. Visual experience is formed by optical
structure, but it is not equivalent to it. To assume otherwise is a futile attempt to sidestep the difficult
issues inherent to the study of human behavior.
CONCLUSION
The dynamics of helicopter flight create an environment. In this environment, pilots learn to
relate particular kinematical variables in perception and action. Learning consists of discovering how
control procedures transform current phenomenal states into those desired in the future. These pro-
cedures cannot be general, since they were acquired without any first-principle understanding of the
dynamics inherent in the context of their acquisition. In addition, control procedures are often
acquired in the context of misperceptions. Yet, because of their contextual specificity, they may lead
to errors in only a limited set of situations.
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